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I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 Viacom v. YouTube (“Viacom v. YouTube”) has become the preeminent Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)2 case of our day.  Its looming decision may decide the 
fate of the DMCA.  On December 3, 2010 the case was appealed to challenge the scope of the 
safe harbor provision and the red flag test for copyright infringing activities.3  On June 23, 2010, 
Judge Louis L. Stanton of the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York handed 
down the original decision in Viacom v. YouTube finding that the defendant, YouTube, fell 
within the scope of the safe harbor provision of the DMCA.4  The court held that YouTube had 
neither the actual nor the apparent knowledge that their website contained Viacom’s copyright 
protected material. Therefore, YouTube was not liable for the $1 billion in damages Viacom 
sought.5  At trial, Viacom argued that YouTube was not only generally aware of, but welcomed, 
copyright-infringing material to be uploaded onto their website.6  Moreover, Viacom asserted 
that this material increased viewership and hits for YouTube, which increased both the value of 
the website and income from online advertisers.7
Viacom alone has uploaded thousands of videos to YouTube to market hundreds of 
its programs and movies, including many that are now works in suit...Viacom does so for a 
simple reason: this kind of marketing works.  As a Viacom employee explained to The 
  YouTube attempted to defend itself from such 
an assertion by highlighting that: 
                                                 
 
2 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
3 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2010).   
4 Id. at 529. 
5 Id. at 529. 
6 Id. at 518. 
7 Id. at 518. 
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Wall Street Journal: 'you almost can't find a better place than YouTube to promote your 
movie.'8
 
 
YouTube also cited to specific instances where upon direct notice of a particular item of 
copyright infringement located on their website, they swiftly took all measures to remove such 
item.9  This case is centered on the issues of what type of “knowledge” YouTube, the Internet 
Service Provider (“ISP”), had with regard to the infringing material contained on their website; 
therefore making the issue on appeal: whether YouTube is entitled protection under the safe 
harbor provision?10
   As the article will soon discuss, case law has demonstrated that the DMCA 
notification procedure places the burden of policing copyright infringement on the 
copyright owner and not the ISP.
 
11  Judge Louis L. Stanton had the initial opportunity to 
shift this burden from the copyright owner to the provider, but chose not to do so.  The 
Court’s decision in the Southern District of New York found in favor of YouTube, ruling 
that they were an ISP as defined under the DMCA, that they did not violate the red flag 
test, and thus were protected from liability as a copyright infringer under the safe harbor 
provision.  The Court ultimately held that specific knowledge was necessary in order to be 
held liable for damages to Viacom.12
                                                 
 
8 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 39 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07-CV 3582), 2010 WL 1004562 at 23. 
 
9 Id. at 519. 
10 Id. 
11 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007). 
12 Id. at 525. 
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II. 
 The Internet is an infant in comparison to the United States Constitution.  Because of this, 
trying to reconcile the two identities is somewhat of a difficult challenge in the context of our 
modern day legal system.  The Constitution was ratified at a time when even the period’s most 
innovative fictional writers could not have contemplated the existence of something such as the 
Internet.  However, fast forward time two centuries, and the Internet is now a pervasive 
technological force that is virtually impossible not to encounter in your everyday life.  The 
Internet is a worldwide system of interconnected computer networks with no central authority.  
Due to its expansive nature, rapid rate of growth, volume of content, and degree of user-to-user 
interconnectedness, it now poses a unique challenge to lawmakers in the United States.  Since 
the 1990’s, Congress has been struggling to gain control over rampant piracy and acts of 
copyright infringement over the Internet.  In an attempt to remedy the problem, Congress created 
the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
INTRODUCTION 
13  “The congressional determination to 
promote electronic commerce and the distribution of digital works by providing copyright 
owners with legal tools to prevent widespread piracy was tempered with concern for maintaining 
the integrity of the statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners”14
 Virtual content is constantly uploaded and sent out on the Internet; examples of such 
content range from videos, to music, to simple creative stories.  Try visualizing this: the Internet 
is a bottomless pot.  Everyday Internet users dump whatever ingredients they want into the pot. 
  
                                                 
 
13 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
14 Executive Summary Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Section 104 Report, COPYRIGHT.GOV, 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_executive.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). (emphasis added) 
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The more ingredients added to the pot, the stronger and more fruitful it becomes.  Once the 
ingredients are added to the pot, all of the users now have access to these ingredients.  There is 
one problem, some of the users are putting ingredients into the pot do not have the proper 
authority to do so.  Have you ever heard the saying there are “too many cooks in the kitchen?” 
As a result, the person who owns the right to that ingredient loses control over that right.  By the 
time this person realizes that their right to their ingredient has been violated it is too late and 
millions of other users are already tasting their product.  This illustration is exactly what is 
occurring with the Internet and copyright owners. 
 A case addressing this exact issue is Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.15  
Congress enacted the DMCA, containing a specific safe harbor provision granting copyright 
infringement liability protection to companies categorized as “providers of Internet services”.16  
This provision protects these providers when third party users commit copyright infringement 
while using their service.17  For example, if AT&T were providing Internet service to a group of 
people and an individual committed copyright infringement by downloading a song they did not 
pay for on the AT&T Internet connection, AT&T would not be held liable for violating the 
copyright owner’s rights to that song, assuming they meet the safe harbor provision.  The case of 
Viacom v. YouTube stems from the way the term Internet service provider has been interpreted 
and applied to the landscape that the Internet is today. 18
                                                 
 
15 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. Dec. 
3, 2010).   
 
16 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
17 Id.   
18 Id.    
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 Viacom, is a leading global entertainment group with brand and rights ownership for 
MTV, CMT, Comedy Central, Nickelodeon, Spike, TV Land, VH1, BET and Paramount 
Pictures to list a few.19  YouTube was founded in 2005 and is a user-generated website where 
individuals can upload clips of audio and visual content onto the Internet and share it with the 
Internet via YouTube’s website.20  YouTube does not charge its Internet users to access the 
website and generates a majority of their income from online advertisements.21  As of March 30, 
2011, YouTube is the third most visited website on the Internet.22  To get an idea of how much 
YouTube is worth, on October 9, 2006, Google, Inc. announced that it was purchasing YouTube 
for $1.65 billion in a stock-for-stock transition.23  Presently contained on YouTube’s website are 
user-generated video’s which allegedly infringe on the copyrights that Viacom owns.24  
YouTube is trying to claim protection under the DMCA as an ISP, while Viacom is claiming that 
YouTube’s acts do not warrant the application of the safe harbor provision under the DMCA.25
                                                 
 
19 About Viacom, VIACOM.COM, http://www.Viacom.com/aboutViacom/Pages/default.aspx, (last visited Feb. 7, 
2011). 
  
Ultimately, the Second Circuit must decide if YouTube should be held liable for “knowingly” 
storing copyright infringed material.  
20 About YouTube, YOUTUBE , http://www.YouTube.com/t/about_YouTube (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).   
21 Id.   
22 Top Sites, ALEXA (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.alexa.com/topsites/global. 
23 Google To Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion in Stock, GOOGLE PRESS CENTER (Oct. 9, 2006) 
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/google_YouTube.html.    
24 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. 
Dec.  3, 2010). 
25 Id.   
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III. 
 
INTERNET EXPANSION AND COMPETING INTERESTS 
 Historically, the overall idea of a right connected to a creative work has deep origins.  
William Blackstone pointed out in his Commentaries on the Law of England, that the idea of 
maintaining some rights attached to a work of genius or invention traces back to Roman Law.26  
A copyright is, “the right to copy a work, specif., a property right in an original work of 
authorship (including a literary, musical, dramatic, or other work) fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression, giving the holder the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and 
display the work.”27  It was England’s 1710 Statute of Anne that created what is considered to be 
the world’s first copyright act.28  This act granted publishers legal rights to the books they 
printed.29 The copyright protections set forth in the Statute of Anne did not apply to the thirteen 
colonies.  As a result, Joel Barlow, a prominent 18th century poet and diplomat, urged the 
Continental Congress to grant rights to those who produced original, creative works.30
[t]here is certainly no kind of property, in the nature of things, so much his 
own, as the works which a person originates from his own creative 
imagination: And when he has spent great part of his life in study, wasted 
his time, his fortune & perhaps his health in improving his knowledge & 
correcting his taste, it is a principle of natural justice that he should be 
entitled to the profits arising from the sale of his works as a compensation 
  In a letter 
to the Continental Congress Barlow advocated for copyright protections:  
                                                 
 
26 BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 
1765--1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979) (1766), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s3.html. 
27 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1097 (8th ed. 2004). 
28 Statute of Anne, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/26243/Statute-of-Anne.  (last visited Apr. 10,  2011).   
29 Id.   
30 PETER K.  YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 143 
(Praeger Publishers) (2007).   
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for his labor in producing them, & his risqué [sic] of reputation in offering 
them to the Public.31
 
 
Unfortunately, the Articles of Confederation did not confer power to the Continental Congress to 
enact a copyright act, and it was not until the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that the United 
States created a power in the government to issue copyrights.32  Both James Madison of Virginia 
and Charles Pickney of South Carolina advocated for copyright laws at the Constitutional 
Convention and proposed that Congress be granted the power to issue copyrights.33  This 
proposal received a majority acceptance and was included in the Copyright and Patent Clause of 
the United States Constitution.34 This clause can be located in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the Constitution, most commonly known as the Copyright and Patent Clause (“the clause”).35  
The clause confers power upon the United States Congress, “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”36
 Congress first exercised the powers granted to them under the clause, with the 
enactment of the 1790 Federal Copyright Act.
 
37
                                                 
 
31 Letter from Joel Barlow, to Elias Boudinot, President of the U.S Continental Congress (Jan. 10, 1783) (on file 
with the National Archives), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/showTranscription/%22us_1783b%22/start/%22yes%22.   
  From the creation of this act to the present, 
32 PETER K.  YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 142 
(Praeger Publishers) (2007). 
33 Id. at 142.   
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8. 
35 Id.   
36 Id.   
37 United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, COPYRIGHT.GOV, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html, (last visited Apr.  10, 2011).   
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federal copyright laws have greatly expanded and now include the granting of rights to creative 
works including but not limited to literature, music, art and film.38
 It is evident from the clause that copyright laws were of some importance to the 
founding fathers of this nation; however, it is doubtful that our founding fathers could have 
foreseen copyright laws acting as a potential roadblock to Internet innovation.  In 
 
Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v.  Grokster, Ltd. (“Grokster”), the Supreme Court of the United 
States observed that there is a “sound balance between the respective values or supporting 
creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in new communication 
technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement.”39  The Court went 
on to highlight that, “[t]he more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation 
may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the 
tradeoff.”40
 
  Nearly six years after Grokster was settled, the struggle between copyright holders 
and technological innovators still exists and is stronger than ever before.   
IV. 
 Around the time that Congress was debating the terms and scope of the DMCA, they 
were faced with the dilemma of protecting the rights of copyright owners and technological 
innovation and expansion.  From 1995 to 2000 the rapid growth of the Internet coincided with 
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
                                                 
 
38 Id.   
39 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005).   
40 Id. at 927. 
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the speculative business bubble known as the “dot-com bubble”.41  There were various 
companies that were providers of Internet service, allowing personal computer users to access 
the Internet for a fee.  In order to efficiently provide Internet service and transmit electronically 
stored information to and from its many individual users, the Internet providers themselves had 
to maintain control over the electronic information uploaded by third party users on its own main 
servers.  As a result, some of the information held by the Internet providers consisted of 
copyright protected works.  The ISP having unauthorized copyrighted works stored on their 
servers and then distributing them to individual users constitutes copyright infringement.  In 
American copyright law, there are two different kinds of infringement – (1) Direct Infringement: 
which is the exclusive copying of one’s copyright by another42 and (2) Indirect Infringement: 
which can be broken into two types: contributory and vicarious infringement.43  Contributory 
infringement occurs when a party other than the direct infringer is aware of the direct 
infringement and they substantially participate in the infringement.44  Vicarious infringement 
occurs when there has been a direct infringement and the person other than the direct infringer 
has the ability to control the direct infringer.45  By result of the infringement the vicarious 
infringer derives some benefit.46
                                                 
 
41 Here’s Why the Dot Com Bubble Began and Why it Popped, BUSINESS INSIDER MONEY GAME, (Dec.  15, 2010) 
http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-the-dot-com-bubble-began-and-why-it-popped-2010-12.     
   
42 Legal Protection of Digital Information: Chapter 1 An Overview of Copyright, COPYRIGHT 101, http://digital-law-
online.info/lpdi1.0/treatise14.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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 The United States Supreme Court case Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios (“Sony”) addressed this problem of liability for a device or mechanism that serves both 
non-infringing and infringing uses.47  The respondents in Sony brought a copyright infringement 
action against manufactures of home videotape recorders (“VTR”) alleging that “VTR 
consumers had been recording some of respondents’ copyrighted works that had been exhibited 
on commercially sponsored television and thereby infringed [their] copyrights, and further that 
petitioners were liable for such copyright infringement because of their marketing of VTR’s.”48
That manufacturers of home videotape recorders demonstrated a significant 
likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who licensed their 
works for broadcast on free television would not object to having their 
broadcasts time shifted by private viewers and owners of copyrights on 
television programs failed to demonstrate that time shifting would cause any 
likelihood of non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, 
their copyrighted works and therefore home videotape recorder was capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses; thus, manufacturers' sale of such equipment to 
general public did not constitute contributory infringement of respondents' 
copyrights.
  
In the Supreme Court’s holding Justice Stevens asserted,  
49
 
 
The Court’s reasoning in Sony can be effectively applied as a justification for the safe harbor 
provision in limiting ISPs’ contributory liability.  Because ISPs have substantial non-infringing 
uses, similar to VTRs, they should not automatically be held liable for contributory infringement.  
However, when ISPs have knowledge of infringing use of their service they may no longer be 
immune from contributory liability.  
 
                                                 
 
47 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 418. 
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V. WHO ARE THE SERVICE PROVIDERS? 
 
For a party to be exempt from copyright infringement liability under the safe harbor 
provision of the DMCA the party must be a service provider.50  A service provider is 
defined under §512(k)(1)(A) of the DMCA as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, 
or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification of the content 
of the material as sent or received.”51  Simply put, an ISP is a provider of “online services 
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore.” 52  From a textualist perspective, 
the definition of a service provider is extremely narrow.  However, since the creation of the 
DMCA the courts have repeatedly interpreted the term “service provider” broadly.  An 
example of such occurred in Viacom v. YouTube.53  In Viacom v. YouTube, the Court did 
not find an issue as to whether or not YouTube fell under the definition of a service 
provider.54  The decision simply quoted the statute and conclusively asserted that, 
“YouTube is a service provider for purposes of § 512(c).”55
                                                 
 
50 See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).   
  An issue can be raised as to 
whether or not this court and previous courts were correct in finding YouTube as a service 
provider.  “Under the standard definition, many websites may not be considered service 
providers, but under the judicially-interpreted statutory definition, courts have trouble 
51 Id. at § 512(k)(1)(A).   
52 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
53 See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y.  2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd 
Cir. Dec. 3, 2010). 
54 See id.   
55 Id. 
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imagining the existence of an online service that would not fall under the definitions.”56  In 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., Perfect 10 argued that Cybernet was not eligible 
for protection under the safe harbor provision.  Cybernet offered an age verification 
program that websites such as Perfect 10, would use in order for their users to show proof 
of age and thereby gain access to a website.57
that section 512(c) was drafted with the limited purpose of protecting Internet 
infrastructure services in mind.  It contends that the definition for a provider of online 
services or network access does not include services that ‘participate in the selection or 
screening of that data or take an interest in the content of that data.
  Perfect 10 took a narrow approach arguing,  
58
 
   
But the court refused to accept this definition and applied a broader explanation of a 
service provider.59  The courts have since taken the narrow definition of a service provider 
set forth in the DMCA, and interpreted the definition to incorporate almost any website on 
the Internet that stores, sends or receives electronic information but does not modify the 
information.60
From the DMCA, the courts have found that a service provider includes any of the 
four following activities:  
  It is arguable as to whether the Perfect 10 Court’s definition of a service 
provider is a good or a bad decision.   
                                                 
 
56 Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP.  L.J. 151, 163 (2007).   
57 Perfect 10, Inc. v Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1175 (C.D. Cal 2002). 
58 Id.   
59 Id.   
60 See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D.  Cal.  2001); see also Corbis Corp. v. 
Amazon.com Inc, 351 F.  Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash.  2004).    
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1. Transitory communication;  
2. System caching;  
3. Storage of information on systems or networks at the direction of users; or 
4. Information location tools.61
 
 
From the activities listed YouTube appears to be a website that engages in the third 
conduct - storage of information on systems or networks at the direction of users.62  
Viacom v. YouTube describes YouTube as a website operated by Google “which users 
may upload video files free of charge.”63  The opinion further holds that, “[u]ploaded files 
are copied and formatted by YouTube’s computer systems, and then made available for 
viewing on YouTube.”64  The opinion indicates that approximately twenty-four hours 
worth of video material is uploaded onto YouTube every minute.65  YouTube’s 
functionality relies on the direction of its users.66
Once an entity has met the qualifications to be classified as a service provider under 
the DMCA, the service provider can only be immune from copyright infringement 
  Based on the court’s broad interpretation 
of a service provider and YouTube’s basic functions as a website, YouTube is and was 
correctly found to be a service provider.    
                                                 
 
61 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S.  Copyright Office Summary, U.S.  COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
62 See YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/, (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
63 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2010). 
64 Id.   
65 Id. 
66 See YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/, (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
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occurring through the use of its service by meeting the standards set forth under the safe 
harbor provision of section 512(i) of the DMCA.67  The service provider must also: (1) 
adopt and reasonably implement a policy of terminating in appropriate circumstances the 
accounts of subscribers who are repeat [copyright] infringers; and (2) accommodate and 
not interfere with ‘standard technical measures.’68
  In Ellison v. Robertson, the court subdivided condition (1), the repeat infringer 
policy, into three requirements for a service provider.
 
69  The service provider must: (1) 
adopt a policy that provides for the termination of service access for repeat copyright 
infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2) implement that policy in a reasonable manner; 
and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy.”70
Condition (2), standard technical measures, has been defined as, “measures that 
copyright owner[s] use to identify or protect copyrighted works, that have been developed 
pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair 
and voluntary multi-industry process, are available to anyone on reasonable 
nondiscriminatory terms, and do not impose substantial costs or burdens on service 
providers.”
  
71
                                                 
 
67 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (1998). 
 
68 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
69 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir.  2004). 
70 Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 151, 161 (2007); quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir.  2004).   
71 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
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However, just fitting the mold of an ISP and qualifying for protection under the safe 
harbor provision of the DMCA, does not necessarily shield an ISP from liability.72
1. The provider must not have the requisite level of knowledge of the infringing activity;  
 In order 
for YouTube to receive continuous protection from the safe harbor provision, the following 
three conditions must be met: 
 
2. If the provider has the right and ability to control the infringing activity, it must not 
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity; and  
 
3. Upon receiving proper notification of claimed infringement, the provider must 
expeditiously take down or block access to the material.73
 
  
The first condition is discussed in section 512(c)(1)(A) of the DMCA, the safe 
harbor provision. It limits an ISP’s protection under the safe harbor provision based on the 
ISP’s knowledge of copyright infringing material on their system or network.74
(1) In general. — A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, 
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
  Section 
512(c)(1)(A) provides: 
                                                 
 
72 See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (1998). 
73 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf; See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998). 
74 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (1998). 
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resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the 
service provider - 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material;75
 
 
This provision can be broken down into three independent prongs: (1) Actual 
knowledge; (2) Apparent knowledge; and (3) Expeditious removal.76  The first prong, 
actual knowledge, has been interpreted narrowly to mean knowledge of specific infringing 
material.77  A general knowledge of infringing material residing on one’s site does not 
seem to be enough.  A court has yet to set a defined standard as to when an ISP has actual 
knowledge absent the failure to take down specific infringing material upon receiving 
notification.78  It has not been suggested that service providers have the affirmative duty to 
search for infringing material.79
                                                 
 
75 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (1998). 
 
76 Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP.  L.J.  151, 161 (2007); See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (1998).   
77 See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.  § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (1998); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
78 Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J.  151, 164 (2007). 
79 Id; See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004).   
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Before discussing the second prong, the third prong, expeditious removal, simply 
requires the service provider to create a “take-down” system.80  Upon being notified that 
infringing material is on their site, an ISP must “expeditiously” remove the material from 
the network.  Additionally, Section 512(c)(2) requires the service provider to create a 
“designated agent” that allows copyright owners to notify the agent of such infringed 
copyright material.81  YouTube has proven to satisfy its duties under the “take-down” 
system, as well as, doing their part in providing an agent where notifications can be sent.82  
In Viacom v. YouTube, Viacom recognized the fact that YouTube would remove their 
infringed material upon being notified by Viacom.83
The second prong, apparent knowledge, requires that in the absence of actual 
knowledge, the ISP be unaware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.
  
84  It is this prong that has become known as the “red flag” test.85  The test can be 
divided more easily into two parts, a subjective part and an objective part: (1) was the 
service provider aware of infringing material and (2) whether infringing activity would 
have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar 
circumstances.86
                                                 
 
80 See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (1998). 
  If the answer is yes to either part then the ISP had apparent knowledge. 
81 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (1998). 
82 See Copyright Infringement Notification, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/t/dmca_policy, (last visited Feb. 
6, 2011). 
83 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2010). 
84 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1998).   
85 See Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor, 28 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195 (2010). 
86 Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 201-202 (2010); See also H.R.Rep. No. 105 – 551, pt. 2 (1998).   
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There has been some public criticism concerning the applicability of the red flag test.  
Depending on the court’s interpretation of the red flag test YouTube could be held liable.  
Critics have suggested that Viacom v. YouTube has rendered the red flag test useless and 
essentially equivalent to the “actual knowledge” prong.87  Their observation is a valid one.  
Apparent knowledge has never been found through the red flag test.88
Another criticism of the Viacom v. YouTube decision has been its interpretation of 
section 512(c)(1)(B).  This section of the safe harbor provision states that an ISP is 
protected from liability if it “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to 
control such activity.”
  When applying the 
test generally, YouTube undoubtedly knows that infringing material is uploaded onto their 
site.  Under this simple application of the red flag test YouTube should have been liable.  
The court did not use this application.   
89  The court in Viacom v. YouTube found that in order to invoke the 
“financial benefit argument” the ISP needed knowledge, actual or apparent, of infringing 
activity.90
                                                 
 
87 See Scott A. Zebrak, Viacom v.YouTube: a missed opportunity, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463839409&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.   
 The language of the statute does not clearly prescribe that knowledge first be 
proven.  However, the court’s interpretation seems logical.  It would be difficult to find an 
infringement case where the service provider had not been financially benefiting. 
Therefore, the court in Viacom v. YouTube made the best decision when determining that 
88 Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 203 (2010).   
89 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (1998). 
90 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2010). 
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the service provider must have knowledge (actual or apparent) to be found liable for 
financial gain from infringing activity.   
Section 512(c)(1)(C) of the safe harbor provision merely re-establishes the “take-
down” requirement upon notification of the claimed infringement.91  The provision states, 
“upon notification of claimed infringement…responds expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing 
activity.”92
 
  It is an important part of the safe harbor statute but is irrelevant for this 
discussion.  The most troubling issue with the DMCA safe harbor provision rests in the 
knowledge prongs of the statute.  
VI. 
 
CASES DEALING WITH THE DMCA & SAFE HARBOR PROVISION 
  
The recent case history pertaining to the knowledge prongs have paved the way for 
Viacom v. YouTube. Some of the most influential holdings on this issue include, (1) 
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.93, (2) Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 94, 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC.,95 (3) Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com,96 (4)  Arista 
Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC97
                                                 
 
91 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (1998). 
.  Tiffany and Perfect 10 raised the knowledge 
threshold that a service provider must have with regard to the acts of copyright 
infringement and outlined the precautionary measures that a service provider must take in 
92 Id. 
93 Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
94 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayor Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
95 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
96Arista Records, LLC v. Usenet.com, 633 F.Supp.2d 124 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
97Arista Records v. Lime Group, LLC, 715 F.Supp.2d 481 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
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order to be protected under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA.98  Distinguished from 
the outcome in Viacom v. YouTube, both Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd. and Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com were cases where the court ruled against the 
service provider and did not grant them protection from the DMCA’s safe harbor 
provision.99
 
  
 1.  Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc. 
 
eBay is the proprietor of www.eBay.com, an Internet-based marketplace that allows 
those who register with it to purchase goods from and sell goods to others.100  As of early 
2011, eBay was the twenty-fifth most visited website in the United States.101  eBay 
provides the venue for the sale of the goods but does not do the selling of the goods 
themselves nor does it ever actually have physical possession of the goods.102  At any given 
time eBay contains some 100 million listings.103  eBay generates revenue by charging 
sellers to use its listing services and by owning and processing purchases through 
Paypal.104
                                                 
 
98 Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
  Ultimately, eBay’s revenue is directly correlated to the volume of goods it has 
listed and sold on its website.   
99 Arista Records v. Lime Group, LLC, 715 F.Supp.2d 481 (2nd Cir. 2010); Arista Records, LLC v. 
Usenet.com, 633 F.Supp.2d 124 (2nd Cir. 2010); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayor Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 
913 (2005). 
100 Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
101 Top Sites by Country, ALEXA.COM, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/US (last visited April 10, 2011). 
102 Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2nd Cir.  2010).   
103 Id. at 97. 
104 Id.   
46 PACE I.P., SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM [VOL. 1 
 
 
Tiffany is a world-famous branded jewelry seller.105  Prior to 2004, Tiffany became 
aware that its counterfeit merchandise was being sold on eBay.106  Tiffany conducted 
several surveys and tests which discovered that a significant portion of the alleged 
authentic “Tiffany” sterling-silver jewelry listed on the eBay website was counterfeit.107  It 
was suggested that eBay knew that some portion of the “Tiffany” goods sold on its website 
might be counterfeit while some were also authentic.108  Because eBay facilitated the sale 
of authentic and counterfeit Tiffany’s goods, it accumulated substantial revenue from the 
sales.  It was reported that eBay earned $4.1 million in revenue from completed listings 
with “Tiffany” in the listing title.109
· Spends $20 million each year on tools to promote trust and safety on 
its website.
  Although counterfeit Tiffany’s jewelry was sold on 
eBay, this is not to say that eBay did not take precautions to keep counterfeit merchandise 
off their website.  The Second Circuit found that eBay had taken the following precautions: 
110
· Created a “Fraud Engine” for the purpose of ferreting out illegal 
listings.  
 
111
· Established the “Verified Rights Owner (VERO) Program” a notice 
and takedown system allowing the owners of IP rights (i.e. Tiffany, 
Inc.) to report to eBay any listing offering of potentially infringing 
items.  
 
112
· Maintains “About Me” pages on the website to inform eBay users 
about their products’ Intellectual Property rights and legal 
positions.
 
113
                                                 
 
105 Id.   
 
106 Id. at 97. 
107 Id. at 97. 
108 Id. at 98.   
109 Id. at 98.   
110 Id. at 98. 
111 Id. at 98. 
112 Id. at 99. 
113 Id. at 99.   
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· Suspends hundreds of thousands of sellers every year for engaging in 
infringing activity.114
 
 
While eBay attempted to reduce the sale of counterfeit items on its website, it also 
actively sought to promote the sales of premium and branded jewelry through 
advertisements and promotions that contained hyperlinks to the eBay website, some of 
which contained images of Tiffany merchandise.115  eBay also purchased sponsored-link 
advertisements on various search engines to promote the availability of Tiffany items on its 
website.116
Tiffany initiated the action against eBay on July 15, 2004, alleging that eBay’s 
conduct facilitating and advertising the sale of  “Tiffany” goods which later turned out to 
be counterfeit constituted direct and contributory trademark infringement, trademark 
dilution and false advertising.
 
117  On July 14, 2008, following a bench trial, the district 
court found in favor of eBay on all claims.118  Tiffany appealed from the district court’s 
judgment for eBay.119  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 
the judgment of the district court with respect to the claims of trademark infringement and 
dilution and remanded the case to the district court on the issue of false advertising.120
The parties focused their attention on the issue of contributory trademark 
infringement for culpably facilitating the infringing conduct of the counterfeiting 
 
                                                 
 
114 Id. at 100. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 101. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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vendors.121  According to common law, contributory infringement occurs when “a 
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it 
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in 
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributory liable for any harm 
done as a result of the deceit.”122  This language is very similar to the red flag knowledge 
conditions contained in the DMCA safe harbor provision.  The issue the court faced in 
Tiffany regarding this language turned upon the fact that it was ill-defined and did not lay-
out which acts constitute contributory trademark infringement.123
In order to render a decision, the court used a test set forth in Inwood Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.
  Additionally, there was 
limited case law to guide the court in its decision.   
124  Inwood held that a provider is liable if either the provider 
“intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark” or the provider “continues to supply 
to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.”125
                                                 
 
121 Id. at 103. 
  
Tiffany argued that eBay continued to supply it services to its users with reason to know 
that some of the items sold by these users were counterfeit.  The district court ultimately 
concluded, which the Second Circuit later affirmed, that to hold eBay liable for 
contributory infringement, Tiffany would have to show that eBay “knew or had reason to 
know of specific instances of actual infringement” beyond those that it addressed upon 
122 Id. at 104. 
123 Id. at 105. 
124 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
125 Id. at 854. 
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notification.”126  “A service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason 
to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods.  Some contemporary 
knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is 
necessary.”127
In Viacom v. YouTube, Judge Stanton addresses Tiffany in his decision.  Both 
cases raise the question as to the liability of the service provider for the actions of its third 
party users.  eBay and YouTube are both primarily user-generated websites.   Tiffany and 
Viacom are both companies whose property rights were infringed by third-party users of 
the service providers.  The difference between Tiffany  and Viacom v. YouTube lies in the 
causes of actions brought by the plaintiffs.  In Tiffany, eBay was sued for trademark 
infringement while in Viacom, YouTube was sued for copyright infringement.  Judge 
Stanton wrote: 
  The requirement of specific knowledge in Tiffany resembles closely to the 
actual knowledge requirement found in the DMCA and in the Viacom v. YouTube district 
court decision.   
Although a different technique, the DMCA applies the same principle, and its 
establishment of a safe harbor is clear and practical: if a service provider knows (from 
notice from the owner or a “red flag”) of specific instances of infringement, the provider 
must promptly remove the infringing material.  If not, the burden is on the owner to 
                                                 
 
126 Id. at 103. 
127 Id. at 107. 
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identify the infringement.  General knowledge that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ does not 
impose a duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements.128
 
 
Judge Stanton’s holding in Viacom v. YouTube, reaffirms the ruling in Tiffany by 
leaving the burden of policing infringement to the intellectual property owner.  Like 
YouTube, eBay’s primary purpose as a service provider has been protected but it has left 
the trademark owner, Tiffany, without a remedy.   
 
 2.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster  
 
In 2003, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios along with various motion picture studios, 
recording companies, songwriters, and music publishers, collectively to be referred to as 
“MGM”, brought suit against two peer-to-peer (“P2P”) software owners, Grokster, Ltd., and 
StreamCast Networks, Inc., collectively to be referred to as “Grokster”.129  MGM alleged that 
Grokster was liable for acts of copyright infringement by knowingly promoting the use of their 
software programs to their users to infringe copyrights.130  The United States District Court for 
the Central District of California held that the users of Grokster directly infringed MGM’s 
copyrights by downloading copyrighted media files using Grokster’s software program, but that 
Grokster was not directly liable because they did not have actual knowledge as to the specific 
acts of infringement.131
                                                 
 
128 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd 
Cir.  Dec. 3, 2010). 
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
129 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, LTD., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
130 Id. at 927. 
131 Id. at 927. 
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district court’s holding, finding the decentralized structure of Grokster’s software programs 
rendered them incapable of having actual knowledge of the infringement activity from their 
software users and thus were not vicariously liable.132  In 2004, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to review the case and in a vote of 7-0, the Court unanimously reversed the 
lower courts’ findings, granting summary judgment in favor of MGM.133  Overall, the issue 
facing the Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, was, “[u]nder what 
circumstances is a distributor of a product, where the product is capable of both a lawful and 
unlawful use, liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties who use the product?”134 
In MGM v. Grokster, the defendant parties did not assert a defense under the DMCA.  Even if 
Grokster qualified as a service provider under the DMCA and were able to invoke legal 
protections under the DMCA’s safe harbor provision, Grokster likely would have been found 
guilty of contributory liability for copyright infringement.  There was evidence that Grokster 
took active steps to induce infringement by its users through advertisements and failed to 
develop a filtering tool to diminish the infringing activity produced from use of their software.135  
The district court in Viacom v. YouTube distinguished YouTube from Grokster, stating that 
YouTube did not exist “solely to provide the site and facilities for copyright infringement.”136  
While, in MGM v. Grokster
                                                 
 
132 Id. at 927-928. 
 the court held that Grokster’s P2P software programs “aimed to 
have a larger number of copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file-sharing 
133 Id. at 942. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 924-927. 
136 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2010). 
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networks” and “sent users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular 
copyrighted materials.”137
 One reason that 
 
Viacom v. YouTube came out in favor of the ISP while MGM v. 
Grokster came out in favor of the copyright holders was because of how YouTube dealt with the 
notification and knowledge of infringing uses of their product.  While it can be said that both 
YouTube and Grokster financially benefitted from third party individuals using their services to 
engage in copyright infringement YouTube has a system where an agent receives complaints of 
infringement and removes identified material when they learn of the infringement.138  YouTube 
complied with the DMCA and qualified for protection under the Safe Harbor Provision.139  
Conversely, Grokster “never blocked anyone from continuing to use its software to share 
copyrighted files.  Grokster not only rejected another company’s offer to help monitor 
infringement, but blocked the Internet Protocol addresses of entities it believed were trying to 
engage in such monitoring on its networks.”140
 What is difficult to reconcile between 
  
MGM v. Grokster and Viacom v. YouTube is the 
prevalence of infringement.  Based on a study commissioned by MGM, nearly 90% of the files 
available for download using Grokster’s software P2P programs were copyrighted works.141  In, 
Viacom v. YouTube
                                                 
 
137 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, LTD., 545 U.S. 913, 926-927 (2005). 
, it was alleged at trial that “over twenty-four hours of new video-viewing 
138 Id. at 926-27. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 922. 
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time is uploaded to the YouTube website every minute”142 and Viacom contends that “tens of 
thousands of videos on YouTube, resulting in hundreds of millions of views, were taken 
unlawfully from Viacom’s copyrighted works without authorization.”143
 
  It is hard to deny that 
YouTube does not know the extent to which their own website is abused by third party users in 
uploading and sharing copyrighted material.  If all that separates the acts of Grokster and the acts 
of YouTube are a few advertisements soliciting copyrighted works and an infringement 
notification system, it is difficult to understand why the district court found that YouTube passed 
the red flag test.   
 3.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC 
 
In 2007, Perfect 10 brought an action against an ISP claiming that the ISP allowed 
consumers to pay for subscriptions or memberships to e-commerce venues that violated 
Perfect 10’s copyrights and trademarks.144  Perfect 10 is a publisher of an adult 
entertainment magazine and the owner of a website, perfect10.com.145  Perfect10.com is a 
subscription based website where consumers pay a membership fee in order to gain access 
to the website’s content.146  It holds registered U.S. copyrights for the images they 
display.147
                                                 
 
142 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd 
Cir. Dec. 3, 2010).   
  
143 Id.   
144 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007). 
145 Id. at 1108. 
146 Id.  
147 Id.   
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The defendant, CCBill, allows consumers to pay for subscriptions or memberships 
to e-commerce venues that included sites such as “illegal.net” and 
“stolencelebritypics.com.” 148  Some of these websites infringed upon Perfect 10’s 
copyrights.  For example, if a consumer wanted to view pictures on one of these websites, 
the viewer would be directed to CCBill to make a payment.149  Upon completion of the 
transaction, the consumer would be redirected to the website, where they would have full 
access to view the pictures.150  Perfect 10 argued that since CCBill collected payment for 
access to certain websites that it knew were infringing on Perfect 10’s copyrights and 
trademarks it should be held liable.151  Perfect 10 claimed that the defendants had apparent 
knowledge of the infringing activities because CCBill directed its consumers to websites 
such as, “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com” which they knew to contain Perfect 
10’s copyrighted images.152
CCBill countered by stating that it was a third party and therefore their actions fell 
under the safe harbor provision provided by the DMCA.
   
153  To garner safe harbor 
protection, the Ninth Circuit first determined that the ISP must have a reasonably 
implemented repeat offender policy.154
                                                 
 
148 Id. 
  Since “reasonably implemented” is not defined, the 
Ninth Circuit found that an ISP “implements” a policy if it has a working notification 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 1108. 
151 Id. at 1114. 
152 Id. at 1114. 
153 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).   
154 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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system.155  This notification system is designed to handle complaints made by the 
copyright owner to take down infringing material.  The Court determined that an ISP does 
not have an “implemented” system if it prevents copyright holders from providing DMCA 
complaint-notifications.156  The Ninth Circuit concluded that CCBill implemented a 
DMCA-complaint notification system although there was evidence that it was completed in 
a careless manner.157  The Ninth Circuit only requires the ISP to act “expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material” when it (1) has actual knowledge (2) is aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, or (3) has received 
notification of claimed infringement meeting the requirements of section 512(c)(A).158
The second determination in this case was based on the “red flag” test and whether 
CCBill had knowledge of the infringing activity.  In order for CCBill to fit under the “red 
flag” test it would need to be apparent that the website instructed or enabled users to 
infringe another's copyright.
  
This ruling is important because it holds the ISP to a relatively low standard.   
159  A service provider may also lose protection if it fails to 
take action with regard to infringing material when it is “aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent.”160
                                                 
 
155 Id. at 1109. 
  In this case, Perfect 10 argued that CCBill 
was aware of a number of “red flags” that signaled apparent infringement because CCBill 
provided services to “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” which made available 
156 Id. at 1109-10. 
157 Id. at 1110.  Perfect 10 references a single page from the DMCA log had some empty fields.  The Court did not 
find that “this does reflect any effort to track notices of infringement.”  
158 Id. at 1111. 
159 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) 
160 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
56 PACE I.P., SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM [VOL. 1 
 
 
Perfect 10 copyrighted images.161  The Court disagreed, finding these websites to be 
“titillating by nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to 
increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually 
illegal or stolen.”162
The court relied upon this case in Viacom v. YouTube because it furthered defined 
the knowledge requirement under the DMCA’s safe harbor provision.  Like Perfect 10, 
YouTube’s “[m]ere knowledge of prevalence of such [infringing] activity in general is not 
enough.”
 This holding is important because the court further softened the ISP’s 
burden of determining whether the material it hosts is infringing on the copyright owner. 
163  In fact, the burden of determining whether there is infringing activity remains 
with the copyright owner, not the ISP.  In Viacom v. YouTube, the Plaintiffs claim that 
“tens of thousands of videos on YouTube, resulting in hundreds of millions of views, were 
taken unlawfully from Viacom's copyrighted works without authorization.”164  Viacom also 
alleged that “[d]efendants had ‘actual knowledge’ and were ‘aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity [was] apparent,’ but failed to do anything.165  
Like Perfect 10, the Second Circuit seems to favor the ISP because the ISP does not have 
“the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal.”166
                                                 
 
161 Id. at 1114. 
  Moreover, the 
reasonableness standard places a heavy burden on the copyright owners to prove that the 
ISP had actual knowledge of the infringement.  The Southern District of New York’s ruling 
162 Id. at 1114. 
163 Viacom, 717 F.Supp.2d at 523. 
164 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
165 Id. at 518. 
166 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114. 
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in Viacom v. YouTube stays consistent with the decision in Perfect 10, reasoning that 
stringent requirements167 are not yet needed for ISPs.168
 
   
 4.   Arista Records LLC v.  Usenet.com & Arista Records LLC v.  Lime Group 
 
This suit began in October of 2007 when the Recording Artist Association of 
America (“RIAA”) sued Usenet.com and their sole shareholder Gerald Reynolds for 
allowing users to pay a fee to download illegally stored copyrighted material.169  In 2009, 
Arista Records also filed suit against Usenet.com (“Usenet”) alleging that Usenet engaged 
in acts of direct infringement of the exclusive right of distribution, inducement of copyright 
infringement, contributory copyright infringement, and vicarious copyright 
infringement.170  On June 30, 2009, the Southern District of New York granted summary 
judgment for the RIAA in its case against Usenet holding that Usenet was liable for direct, 
contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement.171
The Usenet system was developed over twenty years ago as a global (online) 
bulletin board which users could post and read messages.
   
172
                                                 
 
167 See Id; imposes no such investigative duties on service providers 
  The Usenet domain was 
purchased by Sierra in 1998 and later developed into a website where individuals could pay 
a fee of up to $18.95/month in order to download a set number of copyrighted music, 
168 Id. at 1114. 
169 Arista Records, LLC. v. USENET.COM, INC., 633 F.Supp.2d 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
170 Id. at 129. 
171 Id. at 129. 
172 Id. at 130. 
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movies and pictures.173 Usenet was able to obtain some of the copyright protected material 
by paying its users to access their data and store it on their own devices.174
It was undisputed that Usenet’s site was used primarily for obtaining copyright 
protected works, some of which were material owned by Arista Records.
 
175  Usenet 
engaged in direct infringement by paying subscribers to download and upload music files, 
which would be stored as “Usage Data” and could then be downloaded by other paying 
customers.176
Arista alleged that Usenet directly infringed their copyrights by distributing copies 
of Arista’s musical works to its website subscribers.  To establish a claim of copyright 
infringement, a plaintiff must establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) 
unauthorized copying or a violation of one of the other exclusive rights afforded copyright 
owners pursuant to the Copyright Act (granting a copyright owner the exclusive right to 
distribute copies…of the copyrighted work to the public or other transfer of ownership).
    
177
The Court in Arista relied on Cartoon Network LLLP v. CSC Holdings Inc.,
  
178
                                                 
 
173 Id. at 131. 
 in 
formulating the standards to determine when a service provider is guilty of direct copyright 
infringement.  The court in Cartoon held that a service provider cannot be guilty for direct 
infringement where the provider’s service acts as a mere “passive conduit” for delivery of 
174 Id. at 131. 
175 Id. at 131-32. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 146. 
178 Cartoon Network, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d. Cir. 2008). 
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works requested by its users.179  However, an ISP can be held liable if the provider engaged 
in volitional conduct supporting copyright infringement.180  The court in Usenet found that 
Usenet engaged in this exact volitional conduct supporting copyright infringement and 
therefore converted their status as passive service providers protected under the safe harbor 
provision into active participants in the process of copyright infringement.181
Arista also brought claims against Usenet for secondary liability for (1) inducement 
of copyright infringement, (2) contributory copyright infringement and (3) vicarious 
copyright infringement.
  
182
Defendants’ subscribers committed direct infringement of the Plaintiffs’ exclusive 
right of reproduction by downloading copies of Plaintiffs’ works from Defendants’ service, 
thereby creating copies of the works on their computers without Plaintiffs’ authorization.
  The court ruled against Usenet on the claim of secondary 
liability for inducement of copyright infringement finding that:  
183
 
   
  With respect to the claim of contributory copyright infringement, Usenet asserted 
the “multiple uses” defense alleged by Sony in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
Studios.184  The court however rejected Usenet’s defense and granted summary judgment 
for Arista on the claim of contributory copyright infringement.185
                                                 
 
179 Arista Records, LLC. v. USENET.COM, INC., 633 F.Supp.2d 124, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
  Arista’s motion for 
180 Id.   
181 Id. at 148. 
182 Id. at 149.    
183 Id. 
184 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (VHS recorder device could be used for 
substantial non-infringing uses therefore Sony as the owner was not liable for contributory copyright infringement 
by consumers who bought a VHS recorder and used it to commit acts of contributory negligence). 
185 Arista Records, LLC. v. USENET.COM, INC., 633 F.Supp.2d 124, 155-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).   
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summary judgment on vicarious liability was also granted.186
 
  In this case, the service 
provider took active steps to engage and promote copyright infringement by it users.  Both 
Arista and Grokster can be distinguished from Viacom v. YouTube in this regard.  While 
Viacom has alleged that YouTube has apparent knowledge of the alleged copyright 
infringement acts by its users, Viacom has not alleged that YouTube has had actual 
knowledge of the infringement related activities and then not taken active steps to remedy 
the problem. What remains a question on appeal is the volitional conduct standard applied 
in Arista.  YouTube’s knowledge of third party infringers, although not specific, is 
nonetheless knowledge enough to know that infringement is taking place.  This standard 
may prove to be a linchpin in Viacom’s appeal.  
VII.  FUTURE SOLUTIONS 
1.   Substantial Precautions as a Reason for No Liability 
Due to the makeup of the Internet, the likelihood of copyright infringement 
continuing to occur is extremely high.   In many situations, such as in the case of Viacom v. 
YouTube, it is not the service provider that is doing the infringing but a third party user.   
There is only so much a service provider can do to protect itself from a lawsuit.   
A potential solution to the ongoing problem of third-party Internet copyright 
infringement would be to raise the threshold of required precautions an ISP must make in 
order to prevent copyright infringement.   A good example of an ISP engaging in such 
                                                 
 
186 Id. at 158. 
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protective measures is found in Tiffany v. eBay.   In Tiffany, one of the most heavily 
weighed factors the court considered was the time, effort, and expenses eBay put into 
preventing trademark infringement.187  The court opined eBay’s precautionary tactics, 
which could be interpreted as praising eBay for good behavior.188  Overall, courts seem to 
come down generously on ISPs who exercise good faith in preventing intellectual property 
infringement by third parties on their sites.189
This is not an assertion that this solution will stop infringement altogether, but it 
will force ISPs to make a good faith effort to reduce the infringing activities.  Currently, 
YouTube takes a number of precautions against infringement and it is not unreasonable to 
describe them as a good example to newer ISPs.   Any user can visit the YouTube site and 
find the link to its “copyright” page on the bottom of the home screen.
 
190  After clicking the 
link, a user is immediately directed to YouTube’s “take-down” policy and directions.191  
YouTube has conveniently provided a downloadable form for copyright owners to notify 
YouTube that their material is being infringed.192  YouTube has taken it one step further by 
developing an “Audio ID and Video ID” feature to give greater control to copyright 
owners.193
                                                 
 
187 Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98-100 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
  This technology allows copyright owners to send YouTube audio or video 
reference files, which contain the metadata of the copyright protected materials they own.   
188 Id. 
189 See Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 
(9th Cir.  2007).   
190 Copyright Infringement Notification, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/t/dmca_policy (last visited Feb 2, 
2011).   
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 YouTube Audio ID & YouTube Video ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/t/contentid (last visited Feb. 3, 
2011).   
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YouTube then takes this information and searches its databases for media matches.194  
Once a match is found, YouTube notifies the copyright owner who initially provided their 
metadata to YouTube, and inquires if they want the located match monetized, tracked, or 
blocked.195  Lastly, YouTube has a “Copyright Tips” screen with links to further 
information on copyright and even offers a library of authorized music for users to “liven 
up” their videos without worrying that they are infringing someone else’s copyright.196  
Based on the recent decision in the Viacom v. YouTube case, it is clear that YouTube’s 
precautionary measures are in compliance with what the DMCA requires.197  Nevertheless, 
this does not appear to be sufficient enough based on the high rate of copyright 
infringement occurring on YouTube’s website.198
2.  Partnerships 
  
Although a higher threshold of precautions against infringement may put some 
copyright owners at ease, the fact that infringing material still makes it onto these sites at 
such an alarming rate creates a feeling of injustice.199  It is evident that ISPs continue to 
benefit financially from the infringing material located on their servers, even though this 
benefit actually belongs to the copyright owners.200
                                                 
 
194 Id. 
  A possible solution to the battle 
between the copyright owners and the ISPs is to promote partnerships or agreements 
195 Id. 
196 Copyright Tips, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/t/howto_copyright (last accessed Feb. 3, 2011).   
197 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd 
Cir.  Dec. 3, 2010). 
198 Id. at 23. 
199 Mark Harrington, Online Copyright Infringement Liability for Internet Service Providers: Context, Cases & 
Recently Enacted Legislation, BC.EDU, (Jun. 4, 1999), 
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/articles/content/1999060401.html. 
200 Id. 
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between the two, thereby allowing both parties to profit from the material.  Looking to 
YouTube as an example again, the website currently has a partnership program in place 
where qualified copyright owners team up with YouTube to create “channels.”  The owners 
of these channels share in the profits YouTube makes off of the advertising posted to these 
channels.201  One of the most well known channels is VEVO.  VEVO as a group, was 
established as a partnership between SONY Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group 
and Abu Dhabi Media.202  Other leading music companies license material to VEVO to 
broadcast across the Internet.203  VEVO entered into a partnership with YouTube where 
they share in the advertising profits.204  This partnership illustrates how both parties can 
potentially coexist while maximizing both of their economic gains.  YouTube benefits from 
VEVO’s music videos because YouTube’s users generally prefer the high-quality video on 
the VEVO channel as opposed to the poorer quality infringing videos.205  The owners’ of 
the VEVO channel benefit from the partnership because it increases the amount of 
exposure and viewership its videos receive.206
                                                 
 
201 Partner with YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/partners (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).   
 This partnership currently appears to be 
working out well.  Is it possible that a similar agreement could be made between YouTube 
and Viacom?  The problem with these agreements and partnerships is that it may just be 
limited to certain copyrights.   For example, a song generally lasts for three to five minutes 
long.   Most YouTube visitors will watch a “video” to listen to an entire song.  Whereas 
202 About VEVO, VEVO, http://www.vevo.com/about (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
203 Id. 
204 Id.   
205 Id. 
206 Vevo Quickly Dominates Online Music Videos, BLOGGERSBLOG, (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.bloggersblog.com/videos/. 
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with television and full length films, most YouTube visitors are just looking for a quick 
clip such as the winning touchdown or a funny punch line.   As a result, it would be 
difficult for corporations who own the television and film rights to partner with YouTube 
to develop channels and only select certain clips to be placed on their specific channel.   
Furthermore, creating these agreements is difficult and complex.  The idea of “working 
together” may be too good to be true, or limited to certain industries.   
 
3.  Ideas on the Horizon 
Another way that ISPs can protect themselves from lawsuits against copyright holders is 
through the novel idea of Internet insurance.   As previously stated, it is not the service provider 
that is doing the infringing but generally a third party user.   With the excessive growth of the 
Internet and the potential for more lawsuits to arise, ISPs will inevitably need somewhere to turn 
to protect their financial interests.   For argument’s sake, let’s assume that the Second Circuit 
reverses the lower court’s ruling in Viacom v. YouTube and holds YouTube liable for a billion 
dollars in damages to Viacom (what Viacom is alleging).207
Any content on [web]site[s] has the potential to raise issues about 
copyright and trademark infringement as well as defamation and invasion 
of privacy issues.  Often an offline liability policy will not cover online 
  A holding such as this could deplete 
nearly all of YouTube’s assets and mean financial ruin for YouTube as a company.  From here, 
the idea of Internet insurance arises.  The current field of protection afforded to ISPs consists of:  
                                                 
 
207 Damages attempt to measure in financial terms the extent of harm a plaintiff has suffered because of a 
defendant's actions.  Damages are distinguishable from costs, which are the expenses incurred as a result of bringing 
a lawsuit and which the court may order the losing party to pay.  Damages also differ from the verdict, which is the 
final decision issued by a jury.   
2011 THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 65 
 
 
applications.   Furthermore, sites that provide information such as 
financial information, health-related information, indeed virtually any sort 
of information that visitors may rely on can be subject to claims.   These 
claims against the owner can arise whether the owner is the creator of that 
content or a licensee of some third party content.  As with the offline 
world, any acquisition agreements with writers, artists, licensors and 
others should contain appropriate warranties and indemnities but these are 
often illusory if the warrantor has no or little assets to protect the owner.   
Thus the need for insurance arises.208
 
  
  In order to protect oneself from major losses, a variety of insurances have acted as 
societal cogs.  When individuals have money attached to themselves, they take out a life 
insurance policy to make sure those around them benefit.  When profitable buildings open, 
they take out liability insurance to protect them from natural disasters.  The current 
situation for ISPs should be looked at no differently.  Some of the most profitable 
businesses in the world are now run through the Internet, it only makes sense for there to be 
Internet insurance readily available.    
 Umbrella insurance209 through an established insurance company may not be a 
functional solution.    The ability to insure for large financial losses means not only having 
the money to do so, but also the willingness to take large financial hits.210
                                                 
 
208 Ivan Hoffman, Online Liability Insurance, HOFFMAN.COM, http://www.ivanhoffman.com/onlineinsurance.html 
(last accessed Dec. 13, 2010).   
  Profitable 
insurance companies may not want to take such a risk.  A number of insurers, including 
AIG, Chubb, CIGNA, CNA, Liberty Mutual, St. Paul, Zurich, and underwriters in the 
209 As its name implies, umbrella insurance sits "on top of" your other insurance policies like an umbrella, to 
provide added financial protection in the event that other policies cannot cover the loss. 
210 JAYSON W.  SOWERS, MONA K.  MCPHEE & RIDDELL WILLIAMS P.S., INSURANCE LAW 2005 UNDERSTANDING 
THE ABC’S, 2005 LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES:  INSURANCE COVERAGE 
FOR CYBERSPACE LIABILITIES, (2005), 199, 224. 
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London market have issued policies providing both first and third party insurance coverage 
in an attempt to meet the market demand.  As policyholders increase their presence on the 
Internet, more insurers will enter the field either through stand-alone Internet-specific 
policies or custom endorsements.211
The likelihood of Internet insurance immediately becoming a reliable insurance 
staple remains a challenge.  First, Internet insurance must be different from most other 
insurances.   Life, car and health insurance all have a large pool of applicants where money 
is made and then distributed.
 
212  Insurance policies use the “law of large numbers,” which 
states, “the more members in an insured group, the more likely it is that the number of 
actual losses will be very close to the number of expected losses.”213  Insurance policies 
also have premiums, which will cover the anticipated losses and are calculated using 
statistics on the probability of loss for each type of insurance offered.214  Current market 
Internet insurance policies come in great variety and no one policy has yet to set the 
industry standard.215  A majority of these policies do not adhere to the prototypical 
umbrella style policy and instead insure “specific, explicitly defined risks.”216
                                                 
 
211 INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CYBERSPACE LIABILITIES, (2005) at 224. 
  Amongst 
the few current cyber liability policies out there, they generally cover the traditional 
offenses, which have been discussed above.  However, these policies have not yet become 
widespread and would be difficult to obtain for a company as large as YouTube who could 
212 Id. 
213 How Does Insurance Work, SUPER PAGES, http://www.superpages.com/supertips/how-does-insurance-work.html 
(last accessed Dec. 17, 2010). 
214 Id.   
215 INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CYBERSPACE LIABILITIES, (2005) at 224. 
216 Id. at 225. 
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presumably ask for an insurance recovery in the amount of hundreds of millions of 
dollars.217
Internet activities expose a policyholder to both traditional and rapidly emerging 
new risks.  Internet-related liabilities and insurance coverage for these liabilities will 
continue to evolve both through court decisions interpreting traditional policies and the 
insurance industry's attempts to develop new coverage to meet demand. Once a 
policyholder's risk and potential coverage gaps are identified, the new Internet [insurance] 
policies may be important risk management tools for Internet-related exposures.
 
218
Given the ever-changing culture of the Internet and as evidenced by the above 
findings, a statistic based insurance policy may be too overwhelming for a typical 
insurance company to carry.   The lack of uncertainty brings about an alternative 
suggestion originating from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”).  The 
SIPC restores funds to investors with assets in the hands of bankrupt firms and otherwise 
financially troubled brokerage firms.
 
219
Annual assessments on all member firms – periodically set by SIPC and 
interest generated from its investments in U.S.  Treasury notes.   If the 
SIPC fund becomes or appears to be insufficient to carry out the purposes 
of Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), SIPC may borrow up to $1 
billion from the U.S.  Treasury through SEC (i.e., SEC would borrow the 
funds from the U.S.  Treasury and then re-lend them to SIPC).   In 
addition, SIPC has a $1 billion line of credit with a consortium of 
banks.
  The actual SIPC fund is financed by: 
220
                                                 
 
217 Id. at 226. 
  
218 Id. at 228. 
219 SIPC: Who We Are, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, http://www.sipc.org/who/who.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2010). 
220 SIPC Protection Versus Federal Deposit Insurance, INTEGRATED PUBLISHING, 
http://www.tpub.com/content/cg2001/d01653/d016530021.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).   
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What if there was an SIPC for online service providers?  Hypothetically speaking, 
the Internet Service Provider Protection Corporation (“ISPPC”).   Perhaps the government 
uses a model similar to the one they enacted with the SIPC and modifies to allow for large-
scale ISP’s to contribute a specific percentage of revenue annually to the ISPPC.  The 
difference between the SIPC and our fictional ISPPC is that the SIPC is used to insure 
investors, while the Internet fund would be used to insure the big market service providers.   
Although this idea is in its infancy, the thought of having major Internet corporations join a 
fund like the ISPPC should be considered.   
Due to the potential volume of damages involved in cases such as Viacom v. 
YouTube , it may be best to fuse both a typical insurance premium with the ISPPC funding 
model.   All Internet corporations that register with the fictional fund would be required to 
contribute money based on probability of lawsuits.  These probabilities would come from 
the same type of statistical analysis done using a traditional insurance premium.  With large 
Internet decisions looming, the ability to insure might aid the ability to expand. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 As society submerses itself in the social media era, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, and more specifically its “safe harbor provision,” provides us all with questions that need to 
be answered.  As this article highlights, the “safe harbor provision” has proven to be 
controversial and could lead to drastic Internet service provider changes in the near future.  As it 
currently stands, the “safe harbor provision” has afforded ISPs a relatively low standard to elude 
liability.  The aforementioned solutions are meant as a framework to stimulate discussion 
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throughout the legal community to develop a solution that mutually benefits both the ISP and the 
copyright owner.  Viacom has recently appealed the Second Circuit decision, which, allowed 
YouTube to keep its impervious status as a non-infringer, begging the question, what will the 
court decide? 
 
